The Boundaries of Belonging: Allegiance, Purpose and the Definition of Marriage by Wardle, Lynn D.
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 25
Issue 2
Symposium: Belonging, Families and Family Law
Article 7
3-5-2011
The Boundaries of Belonging: Allegiance, Purpose
and the Definition of Marriage
Lynn D. Wardle
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Family, Life Course, and Society Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lynn D. Wardle, ??? ?????????? ?? ?????????: ??????????, ??????? ??? ??? ?????????? ?? ????????, 25 BYU J. Pᴜʙ. L. 287 (2011).
 287 
 The Boundaries of Belonging:  
Allegiance, Purpose and the Definition of Marriage  
 
Lynn D. Wardle* 
 
If everyone is family, then no one is family. —Barack Obama.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: BELONGING 
 
“No man is an island.” —John Donne2 
 
This article addresses an important concept theme in family law 
scholarship: that of “belonging.” This has been a major theme in the 
writings of my former colleague, Bruce C. Hafen, a leading family 
law scholar who wrote from a communitarian perspective.3 Belonging 
 
* Bruce C. Hafen Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
The valuable research assistance of Curtis Thomas, Robert Selfaison, and Alyssa Munguia is 
gratefully acknowledged. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Symposium on 
Belonging, Families and Family Law, January 28, 2011, at Brigham Young University Law 
School. 
 1. BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER 347 (Crown Publishers 2004) (1995). 
 2. John Donne, Meditation XVII reprinted in THE COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED 
PROSE OF JOHN DONNE & THE COMPLETE POETRY OF WILLIAM BLAKE 332 (John Hayward ed,. 
Random House 1941)  
[A]ll mankind is of one author, and is one volume; when one man dies, one chapter is 
not torn out of the book, but translated into a better language; and every chapter must 
be so translated . . . As therefore the bell that rings to a sermon, calls not upon the 
preacher only, but upon the congregation to come, so this bell calls us all; but how 
much more me, who am brought so near the door by this sickness . . . . No man is 
an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. . 
If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less . . . any man’s death 
diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know 
for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.  
(Spelling and capitalization modernized). 
 3. Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence, and 
Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 266 (2000) (identifying Bruce Hafen, Mary 
Ann Glendon, and Carl Schneider as leading “communitarian scholars in the family law area”). I 
have been identified as writing from this tradition as well. Id. at 311–12. For examples of 
Hafen’s “belonging” scholarship, see BRUCE C. HAFEN & MARIE K. HAFEN, THE BELONGING 
HEART (1994) [hereinafter HAFEN, BELONGING]; BRUCE C. HAFEN, COVENANT HEARTS: 
MARRIAGE AND THE JOY OF HUMAN LOVE (2005); Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and 
Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1 (1991); Bruce C. 
Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865 (1989); Bruce C. Hafen, The 
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy:Balancing the Individual and 
Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983). 
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to communities and the essential role of marriage and families is core 
to the communitarian scholarly commentary. Following that path, this 
paper will address the boundaries of belonging, the need to preserve 
boundaries to preserve communities, particularly the community of 
marriage, and to protect and maintain the opportunity and value of 
belonging to such communities. 
The yearning to belong is said to be inherent in human nature.4 As 
Bruce Hafen put it: “People simply feel a desire to be connected with 
others, especially in close relationships. They are feeling the longing 
to belong.”5 From ancient times to modern, from Genesis6 to 
Aristotle, 7 Locke,8 Montesquieu,9 Blackstone,10 Otis,11 Tocqueville,12 
 
 4. Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal 
Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 499 (1995). 
 5. HAFEN, BELONGING, supra note 3, at 6. As Hafen notes, some psychologists identify 
this need to belong as the most powerful and important of all basic human psychological needs. 
Id. at 10. Yet, Hafen says “[o]urs is the age of the waning of belonging.” Id. at 43. 
 6. One of the first comments on the nature of humanity in the ancient Book of Genesis is 
that “It is not good that . . . man should be alone.” Genesis 2:18 (King James). This passage 
introduces the process by which woman was made and man and woman were commanded to 
become one. It is relevant for this symposium to note that the Bible is filled with stories about 
families and family interactions, through which God’s dealings with humanity and teachings 
about belonging are exemplified. It could reasonably be said that the Bible is principally about 
relations within family communities, from God’s family to human families, from marriages to 
nuclear families, to extended families, to family-tribes or houses, to family-connected peoples, 
religions and nations. Consider the biblical stories of Adam and Eve, Cain and Abel, Noah and 
his sons, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph and their families, Ruth and Naomi, Esther and 
Mordecai, and in the New Testament, Joseph, Mary and Jesus. 
 7. Greek philosophers, too, emphasized the social nature of humankind. For example, 
Aristotle famously observed that man is a political animal. As Aristotle explained: “Now, that 
man is more of a political animal than . . . any other gregarious animals is evident . . . . [I]t is a 
characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the 
like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.” 
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 3 (Stephen Everson ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988); see Wolfgang Kullmann, Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle, in A COMPANION 
TO ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 94, 99 (D. Keyt & Fred D. Miller, Jr. eds., 1991) cited in C.M.A. 
McCauliff, Didn’t Your Mother Teach You to Share?: Wealth, Lobbying and Distributive Justice 
in the Wake of the Economic Crisis, 62 RUTGERS L. Rev. 383, 436 n.245 (2010). . See also 
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1.7 at 1097b8-11, 
VIII.9 at 1159b25-1160a14, IX.9 at 1169b3-21 (Jonathan Barnes ed., W.D. Ross & J.O. 
Urmson trans., Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (“Since ‘man is by 
nature a political [or social] animal’ who cannot be self sufficient (fully realized) as a human 
being in isolation from others, but rather can achieve such self-sufficiency only in a voluntary 
community of friends, ‘the chief end, both of individuals and states,’ is the attainment of the 
common good of the citizens of the state through the creation and maintenance of such a 
community.”). 
 8. JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
§§ 4–8, 77–83, 121–131 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). 
 9. CHARLES SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 3 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., George Bell & Sons 1902) (1748) (man is “formed to live in society”). 
 10. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 43–48. 
 11. JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (1764), 
available at http://www.freedomandcapitalism.com/James_Otis_.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2011)  
(“[God] has made it equally necessary that from Adam and Eve to these degenerate days the 
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and Bellah,13 to mention just a few, the social nature of human beings 
has been noted, reiterated, celebrated, protected, and regulated. 
Humans are communal and seek (and flourish in) social associations, 
beginning with the family. We are born as the result of human sexual 
communion; most often and most desirably that intimate communion 
occurs in a special relational community called marriage.14 We are 
born into, or our birth creates, another type of community—a parent-
child community, usually and most beneficially nested within the 
marital community.15 By nature, we generally also seek to associate 
outside of our families in social, business, commercial, religious, 
ethnic, civic, and other kinds of communities which enrich and 
broaden our lives and strengthen our society. 
One of the paradoxes of belonging is that the need to belong also 
creates a need to exclude; in order for belonging to occur, there must 
be boundaries, standards defining the relationship, and criteria that 
separate members of the group from nonmembers. All communities 
have membership requirements that define their boundaries.16 A 
variety of disciplines and theories of belonging, community, identity, 
inclusion, and allegiance help us understand how to draw such 
boundaries. A key element in all of these bodies of knowledge about 
belonging is the need to reflect, protect and promote the purpose of 
the community in drawing boundaries of belonging.17 The perspectives 
of allegiance theory, in particular, help us to understand the 
connection between the purposes and boundaries of communities.18 
This article is specifically about belonging to a particularly 
important kind of community—marriage. Marriage is the primary 
expression of and preferred locus for the most meaningful and socially 
 
different sexes should sweetly attract each other, form societies of single families, of which 
larger bodies and communities are as naturally, mechanically, and necessarily combined as the 
dew of heaven and the soft distilling rain is collected by the all enlivening heat of the sun.”). 
 12. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835). 
 13. ROBERT N. BELLAH, ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE viii (1985). 
 14. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2)(D) (2006) (sex education programs should teach 
that sexual activity should occur in “a mutually faithful monogamous relationships in [the] 
context of marriage”); John E. Taylor, Family Values, Courts, and Culture War: The Case of 
Abstinence-Only Sex Education, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1053, 1053–55 (2010); Lynn D. 
Wardle, The Biological Causes and Consequences of Homosexual Behavior and Their Relevance 
for Family Law Policies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 1023–29 (2007). 
 15. See generally Sara S. McLanahan, Fragile Families and the Marriage Agenda, in 
FRAGILE FAMILIES AND THE MARRIAGE AGENDA 1 (Lori Kowaleski-Jones & Nicholas H. 
Wolfinger eds., 2006). 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
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beneficial forms of intimate belonging. Though many other personally 
meaningful and fulfilling relationships exist, the benefits of marriage 
to society and to family members are unique.19 
As with inclusion in other communities, membership in the 
community of marriage requires an understanding of the boundaries of 
that relationship and some necessary exclusion to preserve the 
community and institution of marriage.20 Some kinds of belonging are 
inconsistent with and contrary to the core purposes of the community. 
A well-intentioned trend towards inclusiveness in public policies and 
laws relating to family relations has spawned some excesses that have 
harmed some families and generated confusion in family law and in 
social expectations concerning marriage.21 While inclusion is usually 
identified with caring and empathy, sometimes greater caring and 
deeper empathy require exclusion and protection of boundaries. When 
inclusion undermines the purposes, meaning, and functions of a core 
social institution, long-term negative family social consequences 
outweigh short-term benefits for the additional members included (as 
explained in Part II below). 
 
 19. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (marriage is the “foundation of the 
family in our society”); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (“[M]arriage involves 
interests of basic importance in our society.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
(marriage is a fundamental freedom); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage 
is a “basic civil right[]” and “fundamental” to human existence); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 
190, 205 (1888) (marriage is “the most important relation in life”); see also Teresa Stanton 
Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage: Asking for the Impossible?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 
1245, 1262 (1998); George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J. L. & 
POL’Y 581 (1999); Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate 
a Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage,  39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735 (1998). Recognition 
of the importance of marriage as the foundational social unit underlies the state marriage 
amendments that have been adopted in thirty states already. See William C. Duncan, Thirty (30) 
State Marriage Amendments & Maine Question 1: Language, Votes and Origins reprinted in 
Lynn D. Wardle, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding, Democracy, and the 
Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 951, app. 1, at 993 (2010) [hereinafter Wardle, Section Three]. 
That is also the judgment of the thirty-five national constitutions that extend special protection to 
conjugal marriage. See Lynn D. Wardle, Who Decides? The Federal Architecture of DOMA and 
Comparative Marriage Recognition, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 143 (2010). Even while invalidating 
that state’s dual-gender requirement for marriage, the California Supreme Court noted (perhaps 
instrumentally) that marriage has unique, intangible qualities that distinguish it from other 
relationships. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 424–25 (Cal. 2008). 
 20. See infra, Part II. 
 21. One example is the American Law Institute’s proposed extension of equivalent 
parental rights to “de facto parents” and “parents by estoppel,” and other expansions of inclusion 
in the status and benefits of family relationships. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, ch. 2 (2002). See generally 
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) and the chapters therein, 
including Robin Fretwell Wilson, Introduction, id. at 1; Lynn D. Wardle, Beyond Fault and No-
Fault in the Reform of Marital Dissolution Law, id. at 9; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved 
Trust: Reflections on the ALI’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, id. at 90; Marsha Garrison, 
Marriage Matters: What’s Wrong with the ALI’s Domestic Partnership Proposal, id. at 305; Jane 
Adolphe, The Principle’s and Canada’s “Beyond Conjugality” Report: The Move towards 
Abolition of State Marriage Laws, id. at 351. 
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As with other communities, the boundaries of marriage must 
reflect the key purposes of the community. Gender integration, uniting 
a man and woman in a gender-complementary union, is an essential, 
perhaps the most indispensable, purpose of marriage.22 This article 
explains why allowing same-sex couples to marry would seriously 
undermine the basic legal and social institution of marriage.23 It also 
responds to the argument that since infertile heterosexual couples may 
marry, same-sex couples also should be allowed to marry, noting the 
profound distinction between those two categories of couples from the 
perspective of allegiance theory.24 
Finally, a brief conclusion explains the importance of legitimate 
and inclusive democratic processes in resolving the important social-
legal question of whether same-sex marriage should be legalized.25 
How changes are adopted may be as important, if not more important, 
in the long run than what changes are adopted. Respect for the basic 
processes of democracy is critical in resolving the controversy over 
whether same-sex marriage should be legalized in the American states. 
This article seeks to establish five basic points about the 
boundaries of marriage. First, boundaries and exclusion are necessary 
for all communities, including the community of marriage. Second, 
boundaries must reflect, protect and reinforce the core purposes of the 
community. Third, gender integration is a critical, core purpose of 
marriage. Fourth, legalizing same-sex marriage denies and undermines 
the core gender-integrative purposes of marriage. Finally, in setting 
the boundaries of basic social institutions such as marriage, it is 
especially important to follow the legitimate processes of democratic 
self-government, and not abuse or circumvent, evade or cut-off (such 
as by judicial usurpation of the decision-making process) those 
important political processes which help the society learn, grow, unite 
and heal. 
 
 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. See infra Part VI. 
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 II.  BOUNDARIES AND EXCLUSION ARE NECESSARY FOR 
COMMUNITY  
 
“Good fences make good neighbors.” —Robert Frost26 
 
A “community” is “[a] body of people or things viewed 
collectively,”27 and includes “a nation or state,”28 “the public, 
society,”29 “a religious society,”30 “a commune,”31 “[a] body of 
people who live in the same place, usually sharing a common cultural 
or ethnic identity,”32 “a group of people distinguished by shared 
circumstances of nationality, race, religion, sexuality, etc.,”33 “a 
group of people who share the same interests, pursuits, or 
occupation,”34 and groups characterized by the “social cohesion; 
mutual support and affinity such as derived from living in a 
community,”35 “[t]he fact of having a quality or qualities in common; 
shared characteristics, similarity; identity; unity,”36 and “[t]he fact of 
being in communion . . . .”37 Thus, the very concept and meaning of 
community creates the need to define boundaries, establish standards 
for membership, and identify the common qualities that are criteria for 
belonging to a particular community. 
Numerous intellectual disciplines and traditions as well as 
significant legal doctrines underscore the importance of boundaries to 
protect communities and to give meaning to belonging. These include 
group and identity theory, communitarian theory, and allegiance 
doctrine and theory.38 Scholars of many perspectives and disciplines 
have noted that “groups come into being in order to provide members 
with a collective good, and that these collective goods will often be 
public goods . . . .”39 Group theorists note that membership may 
 
 26. ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in NORTH OF BOSTON 6 (Edward Connery Lathem 
ed., Dodd, Mead & Co. 1977) (1916). 
 27. Community Defitnition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE [hereinafter “OED”] 
at I.1.a, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/37337?redirectedFrom=community# (last visited Feb. 
18, 2011). 
 28. Id. at I.2.a. 
 29. Id. at I.6. 
 30. Id. at I.3.a. 
 31. Id. at I.3.b. 
 32. Id. at I.2.b (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. at I.5.a (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. at I.5.b (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. at II.9.b (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. at II.11 (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. at II.12. 
 38. Group theory is discussed in the next two sentences and notes, allegiance theory in the 
following six paragraphs, and communitarianism at notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
 39. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 26, 30–26 (Harvard Univ. 
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expand to a point of diminishing returns; that is, membership cannot 
be redefined to the point that the marginal costs of membership exceed 
the marginal benefits to each member.40 
Identity and group theorists remind us that boundaries are needed 
to define, understand and protect our institutions, as well as to enable 
us to live in peace with others who are not members of the particular 
community. Boundaries protect the community, its identity, its 
independence, and the relations community members have with those 
outside the community.41 Boundaries also protect our neighbors and 
our relationships with them. 
Clear boundaries—bright lines—help responsible individuals to 
self-regulate, self-monitor, plan and implement plans with freedom 
knowing that they can rely upon the settled boundaries. 
 
To secure loyalty, groups must not only satisfy members’ needs for 
affiliation and belonging within the group, they must also maintain 
clear boundaries that differentiate them from other groups. In other 
words, groups must maintain distinctiveness in order to survive—
effective groups cannot be too large or too heterogeneous. Groups 
that become overly inclusive or ill-defined lose the loyalty of their 
membership or break up into factions or splinter groups.42 
 
The doctrine of allegiance provides an especially relevant example 
of and basis for understanding the importance of boundaries that 
define membership in a group. “By the traditional English doctrine of 
allegiance, every loyal subject was entitled to the protection of the 
king . . . . However, allegiance was conditional upon the provision of 
that protection.”43 In other words, duties and benefits were linked; 
 
Press 2d ed. 1971) (1965), cited in A. Michael Froomkin, Building from the Bottom Up from 
the Top Down, 5 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 141, 150–52 (2009). 
 40. Froomkin, supra note 39 at 152, citing Olson, supra note 37 at 30–31.  Some groups 
may be unduly exclusive— by stigma, demonization of enemies, etc. As Froomkin noted: “It 
would be foolish to deny the existence of these and other related social dysfunctions. The 
question is, which tendencies predominate in groups, the good or the bad.” Id. at 150. There is a 
significant difference if the reason for the exclusionary distinction relates to the purpose of the 
group, focuses on the positive quality of the group and does not require the invention or inflation 
of negative qualities or the demonization of excluded persons. 
 41. Patrick J. Charles, Representation Without Documentation?: Unlawful Present Aliens, 
Apportionment, the Doctrine of Allegiance, and the Law, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 35 (2011) 
[hereinafter Charles, Apportionment].  Group boundaries also protect those outside the group 
from intrusion, such as persons who choose not to marry or who do not wish to conform to the 
expectations of marriage from having a marital or quasi-marital status or relationship imposed 
upon them. 
 42. Marilynn B. Brewer, The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same 
Time, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 475, 478 (1991), available at http://psp. 
sagepub.com/content/17/5/475.full.pdf+html. 
 43. William C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural Law Justification for 
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allegiance was the duty owed by those who enjoyed the benefits of 
membership in the political community. As Coke explained in Calvin’s 
Case, “Ligeance is the mutual bond and obligation between the King 
and his subjects, whereby subjects are called liege subjects, because 
they are bound to obey and serve him; and he is called their liege 
lord, because he should maintain and defend them.”44 Membership in 
the political community carried with it significant duties, of which 
allegiance was central, and membership was determined by 
manifesting allegiance to and acceptance of the benefits for which the 
political community was formed. The individual did not have the right 
to abandon the duty of allegiance.45 
The doctrine of allegiance came to America with the English 
colonists. For example, both the Mayflower Compact46 and the so-
called “Arabella Covenant” in Jonathan Winthrop’s sermon, “A 
Model of Christian Charity,”47 emphasize the reciprocal rights-duties 
relationship between rulers and the governed as the basis for the duty 
of allegiance. The landmark 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights 
linked allegiance to the right of suffrage in the political community: 
 
the Bush Doctrine of Preventative War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1450 n.339 (2004). See  
Charles, Apportionment, supra note 41; William H. Dunham, Jr., Doctrines of Allegiance in 
Late Medieval English Law, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 41 (1951); Maximilian Koessler, ”Subject,” 
“Citizen,” “National,” and “Permanent Allegiance,” 56 YALE L.J. 58 (1946); see also Patrick J. 
Charles, Plenary Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of Ideological Exclusion: A Historical 
Perspective, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 61 (2010); Patrick J. Charles, The Right of Self-
Preservation and Resistance: A True Legal and Historical Understanding of the Anglo-American 
Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 18, 28, 42 (2010). 
 44. Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng.Rep. 377 (K.B.), cited in Albert Peeling & Paul 
L.A.H. Chartrand, Sovereignty, Liberty, and the Legal Order of the “Freeman” 
(Otipahemsu’uk): Towards a Constitutional Theory of Métis Self-Government, 67 SASK. L. REV. 
339, 344–45 (2004). 
 45. Indeed, at Anglo-American legal history, at least until the Expatriation Act of 1868, 
ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868) in the United States, the common law “perpetual allegiance” 
doctrine denied individual citizens or subjects any legal right to forsake their sovereign. The 
U.S. Supreme Court in Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 246 (1830), described and endorsed this 
doctrine: “The general doctrine is, that no persons can by any act of their own, without the 
consent of the government, put off their allegiance, and become aliens.” See also 
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 9, at bk. XXVI, ch. 21 (stating that men are subject to civil laws 
where they reside). 
 46. Mayflower Compact, THE AVALON PROJECT (1620) http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
17th_century/mayflower.asp (“We whose names are underwritten . . . covenant and combine 
ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and 
Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid . . . do enact, constitute, and frame, such just and equal 
laws . . . for the general Good . . . [and] we promise all due Submission and Obedience.”). 
 47. Jonathan Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PAGE 
(1630) http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/charity.html (“[W]e are a company 
professing ourselves fellow members of Christ; . . . the care of the public must oversway all 
private respects . . . we are entered into covenant with Him [God] for this work . . . the Lord 
hath given us leave to draw our own articles . . . if we shall neglect the observation of these 
articles . . . the Lord will surely break out in wrath against us.”) (In this case, God is the ruler 
and the people are the governed.). 
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“[A]ll men, having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest 
with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of 
suffrage . . . .”48 
In addition to same-sex marriage, allegiance theory is today being 
discussed in relation to several important political issues. For example, 
under one historical facet of the doctrine of allegiance, “those persons 
who owed allegiance were subject to trial for treason [in ordinary 
criminal court trials]; those who did not [owe allegiance to the 
sovereign] were subject to military authority.”49 Some decisions of the 
Supreme Court have called into question the continued viability of this 
aspect of the doctrine of allegiance as it relates to the law of treason.50 
Another aspect of the doctrine of allegiance is its implications in 
the debate over interpretation of the “natural born citizen” clause of 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.51 One issue that is 
sometimes vigorously debated, despite the seemingly clear text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is whether children born in the United States 
to illegal aliens and to transitory aliens are, or properly should be, 
deemed citizens of the United States.52 The relevance for our 
discussion is that the allegiance-membership connection is a critical 
factor on both sides of the debate. 
Similarly, the doctrine of allegiance is at the core of the debate 
over whether non-citizens should be excluded from the census count 
 
 48. Virginia Declaration of Rights, THE AVALON PROJECT (June 12, 1776), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ virginia.asp. See also MASS. CONST. pmbl., part the 
first, art. VII, X, part the second, ch. I, § II, Art. V, Art IV (1780) available at 
http://www.lexrex.com/enlightened/laws/mass1780/ mass_main.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
 49. Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy 
Combatant Problem,154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 867 (2006); see also Erin L. Guruli, International 
Taxation: Application of Source Rules to Income from Intangible Property, 5 HOUS. BUS. & TAX 
L.J. 205, 212–13 (2005) (history of doctrine of economic allegiance in international taxation 
discussed); Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and 
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 516–17 (1991). 
 50. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (allowing a man claiming U.S. citizenship to 
be tried by a military tribunal); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (stating that due 
process requires that a U.S. citizen captured abroad while allegedly making war on U.S. troops 
and held by military authority as an enemy combatant be given meaningful opportunity to contest 
the factual basis for his detention). 
 51. U.S. Cont. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside.”). 
 52. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 54 (1997); Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in 
Calvin’s Case, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 74–75 (1997) (discussing the natural law origins of 
the rule of birthright citizenship expressed in Calvin’s Case); Katherine Pettit, Comment, 
Addressing the Call for the Elimination of Birthright Citizenship in the United States: 
Constitutional and Pragmatic Reasons to Keep Birthright Citizenship Intact, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 265 (2006). While the language of the Fourteenth Amendment seems to clearly answer 
this question, the underlying policy issue seems to be debated and even litigated with some 
frequency. 
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used for purposes of apportionment of seats in the House of 
Representatives.53 It has been reasonably argued that, historically, 
non-transitory residence in the territory was deemed proof of a degree 
of allegiance sufficient to count for inclusion in the apportionment 
census.54 On the other hand, it also has been credibly argued that 
“birth, together with being a person subject to the complete and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States (i.e., not owing allegiance 
to another sovereign), was the constitutional mandate [for 
citizenship] . . . .”55 For our purposes, which side is right is not the 
point; what is relevant is the fact that both arguments assume the 
connection between allegiance and membership—at least the 
membership benefit of counting for apportionment of seats in the 
House of Representatives. 
In Robert Frost’s poem, Mending Wall, from which the lines 
introducing this Part are taken, the annual spring ritual of rebuilding 
the wall may seem at first glance like an exercise in reinforcing 
separation and alienation; however, further examination reveals that 
the process of mending the wall is a regular social event that draws 
two neighbors together to the boundaries of the physical–property 
relationship, providing an occasion to work together for a while in a 
common endeavor, to talk, and to renew their relationship. The 
boundary wall that separates their property connects them 
interpersonally. Mending the wall between them may be a metaphor 
for (and in life actually is an opportunity for) mending, clarifying, and 
strengthening their relationship.56 
 
 53. Charles, Apportionment, supra note 41, at 61–67; MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE & 
ERIKA K. LUNDER, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXCLUDING ALIENS FROM THE CENSUS FOR 
APPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING PURPOSES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE No. 7-
5700 (Jan. 20, 2010), cited in Charles, Apportionment, supra at 41 n.142; John C. Eastman, 
Politics and the Court: Did the Supreme Court Really Move Left Because of Embarrassment 
Over Bush v. Gore?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1475, 1484 (2006); William Ty Mayton, Birthright 
Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221 (2008); Charles Wood, Losing 
Control of America’s Future —The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465 (1999); see also Steve D. Shadowen, Personal Dignity, Equal 
Opportunity, and the Elimination of Legacy Preferences, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 31, 
54–55 (2010). 
 54. Charles, Apportionment, supra note 41, at 61–67; LEE & LUNDER, supra note 53, at 
11. 
 55. Eastman, supra note 53, at 1484; see also Wood, supra note 53, at 476–80, 504–08. 
 56. Mending Wall is a marvelously multi-layered, superficially simple but very 
complicated poem. The title can be read as referring to or emphasizing the act of mending, or 
the wall. The voice in the poem seems to question the value of the wall. Yet it is the speaker 
who initiates the appointment to mend the wall and who does most of the talking during the 
process, seeming to get most of the social enjoyment from the interaction. The neighbor speaks 
little and is content with the axiom that “good fences make good neighbors,” thus emphasizing 
his concern to be and have a good neighbor. Thus, like the speaking “voice” in Robert 
Browning’s My Last Duchess, Frost may have meant for the voice to be self-indicting and the 
words to be self-condemning of the speaker. 
287] BELONGING, MARRIAGE 297 
 III.   BOUNDARIES MUST SUPPORT THE CORE PURPOSES OF THE 
COMMUNITY  
 
Membership in a community is defined primarily (if not entirely) 
by the purposes for which the community is organized. This basic 
principle is reflected not only in the common understanding of the 
word “community,” but in the principles and theories of many related 
and interested disciplines, including numerous discussions of 
belonging theory, identity theory, group theory, communitarian 
theory, and allegiance theory. Creating, preserving, and strengthening 
communities requires the definition and regulation of belonging to 
those communities. 
The Oxford English Dictionary definitions of community noted 
above all underscore the indispensible necessity of common 
qualifications, collective qualities, shared characteristics, and 
identifying elements. “[D]istinctiveness per se is an extremely 
important characteristic of groups.”57 It is the commonality that 
defines the community. Change the common characteristics, the 
boundaries for belonging to a community, and you change the 
community itself. Thus, the boundaries of community must reflect and 
protect the core purposes of the community. 
The “doctrine of allegiance” also establishes the linkage of 
boundaries to the purposes of the group. These boundaries must 
reflect the core reasons and functions of the community, and 
membership in the community accompanies the acceptance of 
community benefits (the purposes for which the community is 
established) and the assumption of the duty of allegiance to the 
community and its purposes. 58 Non-acceptance of the duty of 
allegiance to the community disqualifies one from membership in the 
community. 
The importance of allegiance in defining marriage is underscored 
by the observation of anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss that 
historically, the core and essential purpose of marriage was to create 
alliances and form inter-group allegiances with other kinship groups.59 
Additionally, the roots of the social compact theory and republican 
government theories historically lay in linking membership in the 
community with allegiance to the purposes of the community.60  
 
 57. Brewer, supra note 42, at 478. 
 58. See supra, notes 43–53 and accompanying text. 
 59. CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE VIEW FROM AFAR 47–48 (Joachim Neugroschel & 
Phoebe Hoss, trans., Basic Books 1985) (1983). 
 60. See also LOCKE, supra note 8, §§ 4, 7–12, 123–30, 211–43; John Trenchard & 
Thomas Gordon, Letter No. 62, in CATO’S LETTERS (1733); Heyman, supra note 49, at 512–22. 
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Blackstone identified the reciprocal duties of membership and 
allegiance as the “original contract of society . . . [that] in nature and 
reason must always be understood and implied in the very act of 
associating together,” and it was that “the whole should protect all its 
parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the 
whole . . . .”61 Today community purposes not only define the 
boundaries of membership, but, John Rawls seems to suggest that, 
such purposes delineate the scope of appropriate expressions by 
community members regarding fundamental political questions.62 
Marriage is a public community status and institution that serves 
both public and private purposes, as Roscoe Pound long ago noted.63 
While individual marriage couplings will certainly reflect the private 
purposes of the parties, such unions also must conform to and 
reflect—and the legal definition of marriage in the United States is 
governed and defined by—the core public purposes of marriage. 
Boundaries are needed to preserve and protect the community of 
marriage. In the family context, this is critical not only for individual 
families, but also (and especially) for society. Marriage is a core 
social institution protected by law; marriage laws communicate our 
shared understandings and clarify our expectations of persons in the 
communities and relationships that are prescribed by law.64 Belonging 
loses meaning if those boundaries are expanded beyond the core 
purposes of the family relationships. As Barack Obama wrote in his 
best-selling autobiography, “If everyone is family, then no one is 
family.”65 One may seek to preserve the label of “family” or 
 
 61. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 35; see also id. at 233. 
 62. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 766 (1997) (“The basic requirement is that a reasonable 
doctrine accepts a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law.”); 
id. at 765–66 (“The idea of public reason . . . . is part of the idea of democracy itself. This is 
because a basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism . . . . Citizens realize 
that they cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual understanding on the basis of their 
irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. In view of this, they need to consider what kinds of 
reasons they may reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are at stake. 
I propose . . . the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.”). 
 63. Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177 
(1916) (“It is important to distinguish the individual interests in domestic relations from the 
social interest in the family and marriage as social institutions.”). See also Angela P. Harris, 
Loving Before and After the Law, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2839–40 (2008) (noting but 
disputing conservative social, political and economic justifications for marriage). 
 64. See generally William C. Duncan, Marriage and the Utopian Temptation, 59 
RUTGERS L. REV. 265, 266–70 (2007) (discussing institutional realities of marriage); Monte Neil 
Stewart, Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities, and Judicial Elision, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 7–27 (2006) (discussing the role of marriage as an institution); Monte Neil 
Stewart & William C. Duncan, Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and Loving, 2005 BYU L. 
REV. 555, 560–67 (2005) (marriage is a social institution and attempts to redefine marriage 
undermine a basic social institution). 
 65. OBAMA, supra note 1, at 347. 
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“marriage,” but through over-inclusive redefinition of the boundaries 
of family relationships, it will be drained of meaning and significance 
for both society and for the individuals in those relationships. 
Thus, two points have been established. First, all communities 
have boundaries and, second, the boundaries defining membership in a 
community must reflect and protect the essential purposes of the 
community. The next questions are —what are the essential purposes 
of marriage? Does the dual-gender requirement reflect and protect 
core purposes of the institution of marriage? 
 
 IV.  GENDER INTEGRATION IS A FOUNDATIONAL PURPOSE OF 
MARRIAGE  
 
Today, there is extensive debate over the essential purposes and 
qualities of marriage.  The movement to legalize same-sex marriage 
challenges the historic belief that gender-integration is a core purpose 
of marriage, that marriage is fundamentally a gender-integrating 
community. 
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the core purpose of 
marriage is to unite and integrate unrelated men and women in long-
term, consensual unions. Gender-integration is short-hand for a 
number of specific essential qualities, characteristics and critical 
purposes of marriage. Among these are “(1) safe sexual relations, (2) 
responsible procreation, (3) optimal child-rearing, (4) healthy human 
relationship development, [and] (5) protecting those who undertake the 
most vulnerable family roles for the benefit of society, especially 
wives and mothers . . . .”66  All of these purposes require or assume 
gender-integrating unions of male and female. 
Society has a great interest in channeling sexual relations into safe, 
socially beneficial contexts, relationships in which there is minimal 
risk of violence (young persons and adult women are particularly, but 
not uniquely, vulnerable to sexual violence and exploitation),67 and 
also little risk to public health (from sexually transmitted diseases, 
dangerously premature child-bearing, etc.).68 Married husbands and 
wives, not insignificantly, are said to enjoy the most healthy, most 
 
 66. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, The Bonds of Matrimony and the Bonds of 
Constitutional Democracy, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 374 (2003) (noting eight, key social 
purposes of marriage, including the five above plus (6) securing the stability and integrity of 
marriage, (7) fostering civic virtue, democracy, and social order, and (8) facilitating 
interjurisdictional compatibility). 
 67. WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 35–36 (1968) (“[S]ex is 
a river of fire that must be banked and cooled by a hundred restraints if it is not to consume in 
chaos both the individual and the group.”). 
 68. See Wardle, supra note 14, at 1022–25. 
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satisfying, and most socially-beneficial sexual relations.69 Likewise, 
there continues to be enormous social interests in responsible 
procreation. That includes providing the optimal situation for 
pregnancy and child-birth (including emotional commitment to and 
financial support of the pregnant woman and child she is carrying). It 
also includes providing the most positive environment offering the best 
prospects for the most beneficial child-rearing (dual-gender child 
rearing provides the greatest protection for healthy development with 
the least fears and incompetencies).70 Gender-integrating marriage 
links and mutually reinforces all three of these social interests. The 
social interest in healthy human relationship development is reflected 
in the terrible financial and social costs (from crime, to loss of 
productivity, to physical and emotional health problems, and to 
detrimental impacts upon children) that result when significant intimate 
relationships break up.71 Gender-integrated relationships are also the 
strongest type of relationship and are least-susceptible to instability 
and to related and consequential insecurities.72 Likewise those who 
make the greatest sacrifice of personal income-maximization in order 
to provide nurturing roles within the family (especially wives and 
mothers) are best protected by gender-integrated marriage to an 
opposite-sex partner upon whom expectations of being the family 
provider are socially reinforced.73 
The core purposes of marriage are built around human recognition 
across time and cultures that men and women are different. Males and 
females differ profoundly in innumerable, essential ways that are 
complementary; thus, the union of man and woman, is different in 
innumerable, essential ways from the union of two men or of two 
women. The integration of mutually matching, harmonious, 
 
 69. See LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 47–52, 75–
89, 152–58, 162–68 (2000). 
 70. See Lynn D. Wardle, Multiply and Replenish: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in 
Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 784–96 
(2001). 
 71. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 69, at 47–64, 101, 143–49, 152. 
 72. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Morality of Marriage and the Transformative Power of 
Inclusion, in What’s the Harm? Does legalizing same-sex marriage really harm individuals, 
families or society? 207, 219–25 (Lynn D. Wardle, ed. 2008) (reviewing literature on infidelity 
and instability of same-sex unions); see also Bradford Wilcox, Honoring Thy Fathers, Catholic 
Education.org, June 13, 2008) available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-religion/ 
2031631/posts (last visited March 23,  2011) (children are less insecure when raised with a 
father in the home); Cynthia Hujar Orr, Meet Marcel Johnson, 34 Champion 5, 13 (April 2010) 
(“One thing I remember about my youth was the constant feeling of insecurity. Things never felt 
right. Money was always tight. Watching my mom struggle and sacrifice deeply affected me. It 
wasn’t fair, in my opinion, for her to have to live the way she lived.”); Concern over absent 
father stats, BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/7959970.stm (last 
visited March 23, 2011). 
 73. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 69, at 150–173. 
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corresponding gender differences is an indispensable purpose of the 
institution of marriage. Gender differences between men and women 
uniquely fit and are reciprocal and complementary. For millennia, our 
laws have protected marriage as a gender-integrative, dualistic, paired, 
and exclusively appropriate institution to bring about particularly 
important social purposes and functions.74 As Professor Bradford 
Wilcox recently declared: “The classic purpose and function of 
marriage is to integrate biology, social conventions, law, etc., into one 
package, which is the intact married family.”75 
In Family Politics, The Idea of Marriage in Modern Political 
Thought, Professor Scott Yenor has recently shown that the uniting of 
genders has been a consistent core conception of marriage across the 
ages, across cultures, and across a wide variety of philosophical and 
jurisprudential schools and traditions, including writings in recent 
centuries from Locke to Marx to John Paul II.76 Likewise, Professor 
Robert George has powerfully argued that unification of male and 
female has been identified in the philosophy of western civilization for 
thousands of years as the core constitutive purpose of marriage.77 
One contemporary intellectual school that provides compelling and 
eloquent justifications for gender-integration as the core purpose of 
marriage is relational feminism. That body includes French feminists, 
African feminists, and religious feminists. All of these groups share 
the rejection of the sterile individualism of most American feminism, 
the appreciation of the duality of humanity (women are different than, 
not mere imitations of, men), the celebration of the great worth of the 
unique and irreplaceable contributions of women to our social 
institutions, including marriage, and an insistence upon their need to 
be included and valued equally in all of the basic institutions of 
society. 
I have recently written about relational feminists’ contribution to 
recognition of the core gender-integrating purposes of marriage.78 I 
 
 74. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 60, at 45. 
 75. Bradford Wilcox, Why Marriage Matters: A Natural Law Perspective on Marriage 
and Family Life, Address at the Wheatley Institution Conference on Defense of the Family: 
Natural Law Perspectives, Brigham Young University, 27 Jan. 2011; see generally Sara 
Israelsen-Hartley, Traditional Marriage Has Impact Beyond Faith, Scholar Says, DESERET 
NEWS, Jan. 27, 2011, at A1, 13. 
 76. SCOTT YENOR, FAMILY POLITICS, THE IDEA OF MARRIAGE IN MODERN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT (2010). 
 77. Robert P. George, What Is Marriage?, Address at the Wheatley Institution Conference 
on Defense of the Family: Natural Law Perspectives, Brigham Young University, 27 Jan. 2011; 
see Sara Israelsen-Hartley, Defense of the Family Conference: Defining Marriage, DESERET 
NEWS, Jan. 27, 2011, at A13; see also Sherif Girgis, Robert George & Ryan T. Anderson, What 
is Marriage?, 34 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245 (2010). 
 78. Lynn D. Wardle, Gender Neutrality and the Jurisprudence of Marriage, in THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 37, 37–65 (Scott 
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will not repeat here what I elaborated there. But by way of overview I 
mention three powerful strands of relational feminism that explain the 
gender-integrative purpose of marriage. 
From a feminist perspective, gender-integrating marriage is 
important because it acknowledges the “mixity” of humanity and 
prohibits exclusion of one gender (historically women have been most 
vulnerable) from the public definition and constitution of a basic legal 
institution. Additionally, male-female marriages are different from 
same-sex unions because they are gender-integrated and manifest and 
implement the important value of inclusion of and respect for the 
different contributions of both men and women. Finally, from a 
utilitarian perspective, same-sex marriage is ill-advised because 
marriage has been customized over millennia for gender-integrating, 
male-female unions, and same-sex unions have different characteristics 
and expectations.79 
For example, French feminist Sylviane Agacinski argues for what 
she calls mixité (which she translates as “mixity” in English, meaning 
“to maintain the specificity of the term in its implication of the 
bringing together of two different elements”).80 Her core claims are 
that “the duality of the sexes—whether viewed as a universal 
existential condition or as a social differentiation . . . will not allow 
itself to be reduced or passed over, but only . . . to be practiced,”81 
and that one “cannot separate the meaning and value of sexual 
difference from the question of generation.”82 
Similarly many African feminists have advocated legal recognition 
of gender differences and representation of both genders in public 
institutions. “[T]he slowly emerging African feminism is distinctly 
heterosexual, pro–natal, and concerned with many ‘bread, butter, 
culture and power’ issues.”83 
Feminists writing from many religious traditions also have 
 
FitzGibbon, Lynn D. Wardle & A. Scott Loveless, eds., 2010) [hereinafter “Wardle, Gender”]. 
 79. Id. at 44–45. 
 80. SYLVIANE AGACINSKI, PARITY OF THE SEXES viii (Lisa Walsh trans., Columbia Univ. 
Press 2001) (1998). 
 81. Id. at xxviii. 
 82. Id. at 22. Accordingly, Agacinski supports same-sex Pactes Civiles or PACS (civil 
unions) but does not endorse same-sex marriage, because “[w]ith the PACS, the legalization of 
homosexuality has no direct connection to the family or marriage because . . . marriage was not 
instituted to legalize heterosexuality, but to regulate filiation.” Id. at xiii. In other words, 
because marriage as an institution is tied to procreation, mixity (conjugality) in marriage is 
essential, whereas in PACS conjugality is not required. See generally Wardle, Gender, supra 
note 78, at 47. 
 83. Gwendolyn Mikell, Introduction to AFRICAN FEMINISM: THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL 
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1, 4 (Gwendolyn Mikell ed., 1997); see also Wardle, Gender, supra 
note 78, at 48. 
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explained the importance of recognizing appropriate gender differences 
in the law and have celebrated gender-integrating marriage. Most 
prominently, a large and growing body of literature by some 
remarkable Catholic feminists seeks to connect contemporary feminist 
concerns with historical Catholic philosophical roots.84 Among those 
remarkably insightful writers is Helen M. Alvare.85 Notre Dame Law 
School Professor Margaret Brinig has also written powerfully and 
perceptively about the covenant tradition and covenant religious 
dimensions of marriage.86 She, and her family law casebook co-
author, wrote: “Opening marriage to homosexual as well as 
heterosexual might be the most dramatic change in the institution in 
American history.”87 
Evangelical and other Protestant feminists have been marginalized 
by both feminists and Evangelicals until recently, and, some 
Evangelical feminists also have articulated justification for appropriate 
recognition of gender differences in the law generally, and particularly 
in marriage.88 
Some Mormon feminists have also written about the importance of 
male-female marriage, reflecting the influence of their faith’s unique 
 
 84. See generally Elizabeth Schiltz, Does Sarah + John = 3? The History and Future of 
Complementarity in Catholic Feminism, Keynote Address presented  at The Family: Searching 
for the Fairest Love, Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Ninth Annual Fall Conference 
(Nov. 7, 2008) available (in video) at https://sites.google.com/a/nd.edu/the-notre-dame-center-
for-ethics-and-culture/video/fall-conference-videos/the-family-searching-for-fairest-love-videos 
(last visited March 24, 2011); Sr. Prudence Allen, Analogy, Law and the Workplace: 
Complementarity, Conscience and the Common Good, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 350, 356 (2007); 
Patrick Lee, Why Marriage Is Inherently Heterosexual, CATHOLIC ONLINE (Dec. 21, 2008),  
http://www.catholic. org/politics/story.php?id=31195; William E. May, Feminism and Human 
Sexuality, Part I, CULTURE OF LIFE FOUNDATION (Feb. 25, 2009), http://culture-of-
life.org/index2.php?option= com_content&do_pdf =1&id=545. 
 85. Helen M. Alvaré, Communion or Suspicion: Which Way for Woman and Man?, 8 
AVE MARIA L. REV. 167, 167, 195 (2009) (endorsing what she calls the Roman Catholic 
“‘communion and mutual service model’ of intimate, heterosexual relationships,” which she 
concludes “support[s] continuing efforts to promote marriage as the crucial social institution 
harmonizing men’s, women’s, children’s, and society’s needs and goals”); see id. at 177–79 
(discussing Brinig); Helen M. Alvaré, The Turn Toward the Self in the Law of Marriage & 
Family: Same-Sex Marriage and its Predecessors, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 163 (2005). 
 86. MARGARET BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY (2000). Brinig does not limit her analysis to the religious notion of 
covenant in marriage, but includes functionally similar other serious commitments that involve 
“solemn vows” that “stem[] . . . from the values of the family members.” Id. at 1. In that sense, 
the covenant idea motivates the parties to contribute to the family enterprise and relationship 
without counting their individual costs. Id. at 84, 109; See also Margaret F. Brinig, Status, 
Contract and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1601 (1994) (book review); Margaret F. 
Brinig & Steven L. Nock, What Does Covenant Mean for Relationships?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 137 (2004). 
 87. CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW: 
PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 57 (2d ed. 2001). 
 88. See Sally K. Gallager, The Marginalization of Evangelical Feminism, 65 SOC. RELIG. 
215, 227–28 (2004); see generally Wardle, Gender, supra note 78, at 53–54. 
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religious doctrine that marriage is a God-ordained, dual-gender 
institution.89 For example, Mormon feminist Camille S. Williams 
writes that “the norm of heterosexual marriage is a necessary—albeit 
not sufficient—condition for social equality for women.”90 She asserts, 
“[m]arriage and the marital family are arguably the only important 
social institutions in which women have always been necessary 
participants.”91 She argues that if women are not indispensable in the 
core public institution of marriage (if two men can make a marriage 
without a woman), women’s presence and voice may not be 
indispensable in other public institutions either.92 
Gender integration is also an important constitutive element of the 
communitarian perspective.93 While most communitarian writing 
occurred before the same-sex marriage debate arose,94 their writings 
emphasized the value and importance of such natural and constitutive 
communities and mediating institutions as marriage and family.95  
Because claims for same-sex marriage are based primarily upon 
liberal, libertarian, and individual rights principles, there has been 
little advocacy for same-sex marriage from a communitarian 
perspective,96 though some communitarians have argued for same-sex 
 
 89. See Alan J. Hawkins et al., Equal Partnership and Sacred Responsibilities of Mothers 
and Fathers, in STRENGTHENING OUR FAMILIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE PROCLAMATION ON 
THE FAMILY 63 (David C. Dollahite ed., 2000) (reviewing scriptural basis for Mormon belief in 
the dual-gender, gender-equal, gender-interdependent marriage in the Book of Mormon, Doctrine 
and Covenants, and Pearl of Great Price, as well as the Bible). 
 90. Camille S. Williams, Women, Equality and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 20 
BYU J. PUB. L. 487, 489 (2006). 
 91. Id. at 487. 
 92. Id. at 494–99 (arguing that dual-gender marriage promotes the social and economic 
equality of women). 
 93. Tanya E. Coke, Lady Justice May be Blind, but is She a Soul Sister? Race-Neutrality 
and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 360 (1994) (“[G]ender 
integration is a constitutive aspect of the communitarian justice that the sixth amendment 
promises.”). 
 94. See generally DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS (1993); STEPHEN 
MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS (1996); COMMUNITARIANISM AND 
INDIVIDUALISM (Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 1992); Amy Gutmann, Communitarian 
Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265353?origin=api (last visited Feb. 8, 2011); Daragh Minogue, 
Etzioni’s Communitarianism: Old (Communion) Wine in New Bottles, 17 POLITICS 161 (1997). 
 95. See also Jane Adolphe, The Holy See and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: Working Toward A Legal Anthropology of Human Rights and the Family, 4 AVE MARIA 
L. REV. 343, 377 (2006)(discussing the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
“reaffirms the centrality of the natural family founded on marriage” and which “recognize[s] the 
fundamental importance of the family and the communitarian perspective of children’s rights”); 
Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81 
(Feb. 1984), available at http://www.jstor.org/openurl?volume=12&date=1984&spage=81&issn 
=00905917&issue=1 (last visited Feb. 8, 2011) (arguing that enduring attachments and 
commitment define human beings, community requires a strong sense of moral and political 
union, and strong unions must be on a community (less-than-national) size-scale). 
 96. Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 446–
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civil unions.97 The communitarian perspective emphasizes unity, 
integration, and cooperation for the good of the community, and easily 
translates to recognition of the value of gender-integration in 
marriage.98 Communitarians believe in an ultimate source of values 
that arise from religion, natural laws, or deontological normative 
factors,99 which consistently endorse and support dual-gender 
marriage.100 
Thus, from ancient Greek philosophers, to the geniuses of the 
Enlightenment, to contemporary post-liberalism, to post-modern 
philosophical writers, the integration of male and female has been 
identified as one of the core purposes of marriage. Gender-integration 
is not a useless vestigial remnant of ancient primitivism, but 
acknowledged to be consistent with and reflective of fundamental 
human nature throughout history, endorsed by thoughtful scholars and 
commentators today, and recognized as serving essential social 
functions that contribute to the stability of marriage and to social 
capital in society.101 
 
48 (2000) (gay rights movement is tied to individual rights, but some feminists and critical legal 
scholars admit the limits of liberalism and gay communities are important part of gay dignity). 
But see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a 
Communitarian Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 572–76 (1996) 
(most academic discourse pits individualistic advocates of nontraditional families against 
communitarian supporters of traditional families but Woodhouse presents a context-based 
definition of family relations based on socially-constructed kinship communities). 
 97. Amitai Etzioni, A Communitarian Position for Civil Unions, JUST MARRIAGE, at 63, 
65–66 (Mary Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004) (advocating civil unions as a “reasonable middle 
ground” for a society divided on the issue of gay marriage). 
 98. See William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery and Save 
Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 985, 1016 (2001) 
(“[S]ociety benefits from marriages that have duties of exclusive sexual relations, and a 
communitarian perspective might require men and women to make some sacrifices of individual 
autonomy for the good of society.”); Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: 
Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1297 
(1994) (stating that American “families retain a communitarian character,” and marriage is 
valued as the “bond between a man and a woman” involving more than mere contract but a 
holistic integrative union); Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the 
Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1573 n.108 (1998) (defending covenant 
marriage between man and woman as promoting the communitarian ideal). 
 99. Amitai Etzioni, A Moderate Communitarian Proposal, 24 POL. THEORY 155 (1996) 
available at http://www.jstor.org/openurl?volume=24&date=1996&spage=155&issn=00905917 
&issue=2 (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). Differing norms of what constitutes right action, moral 
conduct, ethical behavior are implicated in the marriage debate. 
 100. See MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 1 (Martin King Whyte 
ed., 2000), available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/soc/faculty/whyte/Publications/ Marriage_ 
America.pdf (last visited March 24, 2011) (“The contributions to this volume share a number of 
concerns and assumptions. . . . [W]e assume that marriage is an institution worth supporting and 
that American society would be better off if marriages were more common, long-lasting and 
satisfying. . . . [Also,] the declining popularity and brittleness of American marriages imposes 
social costs, particularly by endangering the prospects that children will . . . become competent, 
happy and productive adults.”). 
 101. Id. See also Maria Sophia Aguire, Marriage and the Family in Economic Theory and 
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The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly 
emphasized the fundamental importance of marriage in our society as 
well as in our constitutional system of laws.102 Those decisions 
consistently assume, clearly imply, and directly reinforce the dual-
gender, male-female, gender-complementary nature of marriage. They 
consistently accept, confirm, and endorse the Court’s description of 
the community of marriage articulated well over a century ago: 
 
[N]o legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in 
the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth . . . than that 
which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as 
consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and 
one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of 
all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of 
that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress 
in social and political improvement.103 
 
Murphy remains good law; it has been repeatedly cited by the 
Supreme Court of the United States throughout the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries for a variety of propositions.104 Thus, gender-
integration remains a core and essential purpose of marriage. 
 
 
Policy, 4 Ave Maria L. Rev. 435, 436 (2006) (“From an economic policy point of view, both 
marriage and the family are important. Healthy families are essential because they directly 
impact human, moral, and social capital . . . .”); Maria Sophia Aguire The Feminine Vocation 
and the Economy, 8 Ave Maria L. Rev. 49-52-54 (2009) (non-monetary  contribution of women 
in the family is crucial to family development and such contributions contribute greatly to overall 
social capital); Richard F. Storrow, Rescuring Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case 
Against Marital Status Discriminationin Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U. Cal. Davis 
L. Rev. 305, 352 (2006) (“[M]arriage generates “social capital”—interfamily and 
intergenerational bonds that embed married couples and their children within larger social 
networks and direct their efforts to the good of all.”); see further Robert D. Putnam, Bowling 
Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J. Democracy 65, 74 (1995), available at 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/assoc/bowling.html (last visited March 24, 2011)  
(declining social capital influenced by declining marriage and increased divorce because 
“married, middle-class parents are generally more socially involved than other people.”) 
 102. See supra note 19. 
 103. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (emphasis added). 
 104. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 651–52 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 
(1978); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 52 (1974); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97 
(1958); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 487 (1917); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 
244, 269 (1901); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 66 (1900). It also has been cited by state courts 
specifically for the dual-gender nature of marriage. 
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 V.  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE UNDERMINES THE CORE GENDER-
INTEGRATIVE PURPOSES OF MARRIAGE  
 
Same-sex unions are inconsistent with and fail to meet and 
manifest allegiance to several of the core gender-integrating social 
purposes of marriage. They are by definition a rejection of the core, 
dual-gender composition and integrating purposes of marriage. 
Some advocates of same-sex marriage argue that because all 
married, or marriageable persons, cannot satisfy or further all of the 
purposes of marriage, gay and lesbian couples also must not be denied 
the opportunity to marry simply because they are of the same-gender. 
For example, the argument claims that no state requires a test for 
fertility before giving couples marriage licenses, and that many 
couples who marry are infertile, that elderly men and women may 
marry even though they are no longer able to procreate, and that 
young men and women who are sterile are still eligible to marry; thus, 
the ability to procreate is not a core requirement of marriage and 
inability to procreate is not a ground on which to deny same-sex 
couples the right to marry.105 In contrast, proponents of same-sex 
marriage point out the broader and more complex nature of the dual-
gender integrating purposes of marriage, such as the importance of 
responsible procreation, and the link it creates between child-
bearing/child-rearing and core social interests.106 Nevertheless, same-
 
 105. See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 36–37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (Friedlander, J., 
concurring) (many infertile non-same-sex couples can marry); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (procreative interests of the state are not rational 
justifications for limiting marriage to male-female couples because fertility and procreation are 
not prerequisites for obtaining a marriage license); Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage As 
A Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 1, 20, 32 (2009); James L. Musselman, What’s Love Got to Do With It? A Proposal 
for Elevating the Status of Marriage by Narrowing Its Definition, While Universally Extending 
the Rights and Benefits Enjoyed By Married Couples, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 37, 68–
69 (2009); Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents: 
Challenging the Three Pillars of Exclusion—Legitimacy, Dual-Gender Parenting, and Biology, 
28 L.& INEQUAL. 307, 315 (2010); Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage 
Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted 
Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006); see also Edward Stein, The “Accidental 
Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 403, 410 (2009); id. at 413 (“Women at an age that suggests they have gone 
through menopause are still allowed to marry. Infertile men, people who are on their deathbeds, 
and prisoners serving life sentences with no chance of parole or conjugal visits are allowed to 
marry.”); Justin T. Wilson,  Preservationism, or the Elephant in the Room: How Opponents of 
Same-Sex Marriage Deceive Us into Establishing Religion,14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 561, 
572, 626–27 (2007). 
 106. See DAN CERE, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN 
NORTH AMERICA 8 (2005); Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a 
Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 44 (2004); 
Richard Stith, Keep Friendship Unregulated, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 263, 
268–70 (2004); Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in 
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sex marriage advocates claim that there is no legitimate reason to 
prohibit marriage by same-sex couples. 
This argument for same-sex marriage is reductionist and 
simplistically disconnected from reality. Marriage is defined, 
understood, and intended to be a life-long (but dissoluble) bonded 
relationship. We all marry with the intent, hope, and legally fostered 
expectation that we will remain married until death. As married 
couples age together, they pass through many biological and 
developmental stages; including stages in which, due to the normal 
course of life, they will not be able to procreate, perhaps will not be 
able to have sexual communion, and in end-of-life conditions, may not 
be able to interact with each other at all. Married persons eventually 
pass from mutual interdependence to dependent and care-giver 
relationships. If it is the purpose of marriage to unite couples in a 
marital community throughout their lives, it anticipates and includes 
times in the life of the couple when they may not be able to personally 
perform, contribute to, and further all of the core functions of 
marriage, though they remain committed to those institutional 
purposes. 
More broadly, allegiance theory bridges the gap between ability to 
procreate and marriage for male-female couples. Though citizenship 
does not oblige all citizens, including infants, adolescents, the infirm, 
and the elderly to take up arms in defense of their nation on the front-
lines of its military wars, citizenship imposes the expectation of 
loyalty and allegiance, and a willingness to show allegiance to and to 
do what one can in defense of the nation in times of armed conflict. 
The aged and infirm show their allegiance in quieter, still-powerful, 
patriotic ways outside of the war zones. Likewise, the infirm and aged 
and infertile may not be able to fulfill personally the procreative 
purposes of marriage, yet the nature of their gender-integrating union 
expresses their ongoing allegiance to that social purpose and to the 
institution so conceived. To demand that the institution of marriage be 
radically redefined to include same-sex unions as marriages, 
presenting oneself for marriage with another person of the same-sex, 
is to fail to bear allegiance to the institution of marriage and several of 
its core purposes. That lack of allegiance to a core purpose of 
marriage is one of several factors that distinguish infertile heterosexual 
couples from same-sex couples.107 The lack of allegiance to the 
institution of marriage as a dual-gender, gender-integrating, gender-
 
Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 781 (2001); 
Amy L. Wax, The Conservative’s Dilemma: Traditional Institutions, Social Change, and Same-
Sex Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1059, 1078 n.54 (2005). 
 107. See supra, notes 41–53 and accompanying text. 
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complementary institution, which threatens and undermines core 
purposes of the institution of the marital community, is another factor. 
Another source of concern about inability to bear allegiance to, 
and fulfill a core purpose of, marriage is increasing data about the 
sexual porousness, fluidity, and instability of fidelity in same-sex 
unions. Fidelity goes to the essence of allegiance in the marital bond. 
Yet even the New York Times, a leading journalistic voice promoting 
same-sex marriage, reports that serious studies reveal that the parties 
in half of all studied gay marriages in California had made agreements 
allowing sexual relations outside of the marriage.108 Many studies 
confirm the extraordinarily high rates of extra-relational sexual 
relations among same-sex couples that dwarf marital infidelity by 
heterosexual spouses.109 The standard of both expectations and 
behavior for dual-gender marriages are profoundly different, reflecting 
high moral values in a relational paradigm of fidelity. Embracing 
same-sex unions within the definition of marriage will have a 
transformative impact upon the expectations and understanding of 
marriage, including the commitment to sexual fidelity.110 Preservation 
of the standard of exclusive sexual fidelity between spouses is essential 
if marriage is to survive as a meaningful, socially-beneficial 
institution. Sexual fidelity is especially critical to the safe and 
responsible socialization and rearing of children, and to optimizing 
their chances and prospects for creating successful marriages of their 
own.111 Since marriage “giv[es] character to our whole civil polity,”112 
the deleterious implications of legalization of same-sex marriage for 
our society are  significant. 
 
 
 108. Scott James, Many Successful Gay Marriages Share an Open Secret, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 28, 2010, at A17A, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/29sfmetro.html?_ 
r=1 (last visited Feb. 7, 2011). 
 109. See Lynn D. Wardle, A House Divided: Same-Sex Marriage and Dangers to Civil 
Rights, 4 LIB. U. L. REV. 537, 560–75 (2010) (reviewing literature showing high rates of 
infidelity and promiscuity in committed same-sex relationships, especially gay relationships); 
Lynn D. Wardle, The Morality of Marriage and the Transformative Power of Inclusion, in 
WHAT’S THE HARM? supra note 72 at 220–25. 
 110. Id. at 226–27. 
 111. Lynn D. Wardle, Parental Infidelity and the “No-Harm” Rule in Custody Litigation, 
52 CATH. U. L. REV. 81, 110–27 (2002). 
 112. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888). 
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 VI.  PERMANENCE AND PROCESS: “AND THIS, TOO, SHALL PASS 
AWAY.”113  
 
One of the values of belonging to a community is institutional: the 
connection with an identity that consists of and lasts longer than the 
life or interests or contributions of the individual member.  For 
foundational social institutions like marriage, the importance of 
continuity is heightened because the marriage relationship of every 
couple needs time to develop and mature, and because continuity of 
the core meaning and essential expectations of the relationship over 
time are a large part of what gives stability and reliable meaning to 
society and to the institution over generations and through the 
centuries.  Such consistency protects the temporal space that couples 
need to plan and commit for the future of their own marriage 
relationships, and provides society with a bright-line standard upon 
which laws, social mores, root paradigms, and rising generations may 
dependably rely. 
While change in particular peripheral aspects of the institution are 
common and continuous, there have been few socially beneficial 
changes in marriage of a radical nature over the millennia. However, 
the history of marriage and marriage law includes the story of many 
popular fads that seemed to signify revolutionary changes in the nature 
and structure of the institution of marriage. Eventually, each faded and 
 
 113. Abraham Lincoln, Agriculture: Annual Address Before the Wisconsin State 
Agricultural Society, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin,  Sept. 30, 1859, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 493, 504 (Roy P. Basler ed., unabr. paperback ed. 2001), available at 
http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/fair.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) (“It 
is said an Eastern monarch once charged his wise men to invent him a sentence, to be ever in 
view, and which should be true and appropriate in all times and situations. They presented him 
the words: ‘And this, too, shall pass away.’ How much it expresses! How chastening in the hour 
of pride! — how consoling in the depths of affliction! ‘And this, too, shall pass away.’ And yet 
let us hope it is not quite true. Let us hope, rather, that by the best cultivation of the physical 
world, beneath and around us; and the intellectual and moral world within us, we shall secure an 
individual, social, and political prosperity and happiness, whose course shall be onward and 
upward, and which, while the earth endures, shall not pass away.”); see also Mark A. Taylor, 
This, too, Shall Pass, CHRISTIAN STANDARD (Mar. 31, 2010) http://christianstandard.com/ 
2010/03/this-too-shall-pass-mark-a-taylor/ (“This, too, shall pass” is the proverb repeated 
especially by those who have lived decades and seen the truth of the saying. In no situation is 
this more reassuring than when we’re suffering with the extremes of a season: numbing cold, 
flood-producing rain, exhausting heat, or autumn’s onslaught of fallen leaves. Aren’t we glad we 
don’t shovel or rake all year long? . . . When our situation seems impossible, we can remember 
that nothing bad lasts forever.”); 1 Peter 1:6 (KJV) (“[N]ow for a little while” we must suffer.); 
Lord Jim:1965 Movie Quotes, Movie Quotes, http://www.moviequotes.com/repository.cgi?pg= 
3&tt=47899 (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) (“This too shall pass and when it does give it back.”); 
GEORGE HARRISON, ALL THINGS MUST PASS (Apple Records 1970); This Too Shall Pass, Lord 
of the Rings (Aug. 18, 2004); Sadness Quotes, JOY OF QUOTES, http://www.joyofquotes.com/ 
sadness_quotes.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). (“Remember sadness is always temporary. This, 
too, shall pass.” —Chuck T. Falcon). 
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passed into oblivion, leaving only a few broken human relationships in 
their wake. For example, some may remember the “free love” 
movement of the 1960s, the communes of the hippie days of the 1960s 
and 1970s, and around the same time, the “divorce-harms-no one” 
euphoria of the early-days of the no-fault divorce.114 
Other changes in marriage and family law have also passed, but 
they lasted much longer, only fading after they had done much more 
significant, widespread damage to society—not just to a few 
individuals or couples, or families, but to entire generations. Anti-
miscegenation laws forbidding inter-racial marriage are an example of 
such fads which lasted longer, caused deeper wounds, and left more 
permanent scars. They had the long-lasting effect of nurturing racism 
and a racist conception of marriage because the leaders of a social 
movement (generally, the racial eugenics movement) succeeded in 
“capturing marriage” by changing marriage laws to redefine marriage 
in a way that imbedded it with their racist ideology. 
The danger of such fads is in the amount (scope and time) of 
damage done both to specific individuals and families who are the 
victims of these social scams, as well as to the institution of marriage 
itself. In a free society complete protection of individuals is not 
possible. Neither is prevention of the harmful consequences of 
relationship fads compatible with the foundations of human liberty. 
Being free includes being free to make some mistakes (at least those 
which do not threaten to damage society too greatly or significantly 
harm other members of the community). The greater danger is when 
the harmful fad and fancy becomes part of the marriage or family law; 
then it is institutionalized and not only does the fad last longer, but it 
influences how large numbers of people view and understand the 
institution of marriage. 
The law has a powerful influence in regulating belonging and 
exclusion in key social institutions, including marriage. Montesquieu 
distinguished corruption of laws by the people and corruption of the 
people by the laws, and noted that “when the people . . . are 
corrupted by the laws” it is “an incurable evil.”115 
Thus, the great danger of our times is not the experimentation 
with various forms of intimate interpersonal relationships that might 
be deemed “marriages” by particular couples, families, religions, or 
other sub-groups of society (though that may be very dangerous to the 
health and happiness of the parties involved in those relationships and 
 
 114. Passing social fashions in matters of family relationships seem to reflect the mood and 
maturity of the dominant generation; free love, communes, and no-fault divorce seem to have 
been generated by the baby-boom generation and its preceding cohort. 
 115. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 9, at bk. VI, ch. 12. 
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communities). Such cohort fads and fancies have come and gone 
leaving only minimal harm to society. Rather, the great danger of our 
times is the possibility of the law adopting and imposing those 
revolutionary experiments in new forms of marriage upon society. 
When such marriage experiments are legalized, they become 
embedded more deeply in the fabric of society, making the practice 
last longer and harder to change. Our long and tragic national 
experience with anti-miscegenation laws, which took a full century, 
and a major Supreme Court decision, to correct and eradicate, is 
evidence of the scope of the problem of nationalized legal policies 
about marriage that codify misguided social policies and ideologies 
that crystallize into law-distorted perceptions of marriage.116 
Processes and structural procedures provide important buffers 
against damaging fads and temporary fashions that sweep through 
societies becoming imbedded in the laws. One protection in the 
American constitutional system against the most damaging dimension 
of the adoption of revolutionary redefinition of marriage,—including 
the national legalization of same-sex marriage—is the protection of the 
principle of federalism in family law. That principle allows the fifty 
separate state legal communities to make their own marriage policy 
decisions. Federalism slows, and narrows the geographic scope of the 
radical, deeply controversial redefinition of the institution of marriage 
in the law and partially contains the potentially disintegrating effects 
upon of the community of marriage in society. Thus, a state-by-state, 
fifty state laboratories 117 approach to addressing the issue of same-sex 
marriage has substantial advantages over a national-all-at-once 
approach for resolving the debate.118 
 
 116. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). While some individual states prohibited inter-
racial marriage before the Civil War, see Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-
Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189 (1966), the nationalization 
of anti-miscegenation laws occurred after the Civil War and lasted until the Supreme Court ruled 
in 1967 in Loving that such laws were unconstitutional. Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, 
In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for Same-Sex Marriage, 51 HOW. 
L.J. 117 (2007). 
 117. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.”); see also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 788–89 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[T]he 50 States serve as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and 
political ideas.”). 
 118. See Robert A. Burt, Belonging in America: How to Understand Same-Sex Marriage, 
25 BYU J. PUB. L. 351, 359 (2011) (recommending the “virtues” of not “automatically 
apply[ing marriage redefinition] to the entire United States); id. at 360 (endorsing the 
“multiplicity” of state-by-state resolution of same-sex marriage policy); see also Kraig James 
Powell, The Other Double Standard: Communitarianism, Federalism, and American 
Constitutional Law, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 69 (1997) (arguing for combining 
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Federalism in family law, however, is under attack. Just this past 
summer, two federal courts ruled that federal constitutional doctrines 
compel the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. 119 The great 
danger of claims that federal constitutional doctrines mandate national 
legal recognition of same-sex marriage is that it will mandate same-sex 
marriage upon all fifty states and embed a corruption of marriage 
deeply into our society, just as legalization of anti-miscegenation 
policies did. 
Sometimes the process of change is more critical to our society 
and legal system than the actual changes resulting from the process. 
The process of addressing policy differences by participatory electoral 
politics in a democratic society is intended to strengthen the society, 
not just by the substance of the newly-adopted laws, but by helping us 
appreciate and understand each other better, to strengthen our ties to 
each other by the common effort of seeking to resolve the 
controversy, and by building trust and other aspects of social capital 
as a result of the interaction. Of course, dirty politics, cheap-tricks, 
and coercive cram-down tactics can have the opposite disintegrative 
effect, as can circumvention of those democratic processes by seeking 
quick-fix, winner-take-all legal-result victories in the courts (as the 
unfinished, ongoing political wound of Roe v. Wade poignantly 
illustrates).120 Thus, federalism in family law, leaving the issue to the 
states to decide, has enormous advantages. 
Separation of powers is another structural protection against hasty 
and ill-advised radical redefinition of marriage. Usually the people of 
a political community are less inclined to be led astray about 
fundamental questions than a smaller group of political rulers; liberal 
democracies vest most policy-making power in the branch of 
government connected most closely to the people – the legislative 
branch. However, as the history of anti-miscegenation laws illustrates, 
even legislatures (and the people themselves) can become enamored of 
fads and fashions that lead them to revise important aspects of the 
institution of marriage. That is why there is merit in protecting by 
constitutional provision or amendment the definition of marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman – and why thirty states have already 
done so in the past fifteen years. 
The legislature normally will be the proper body to make such 
important policy decisions in a democracy, not the courts—though in 
 
communitarianism with federalism). 
 119. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Gill v. 699 
F.Supp.2d 374 (D. Mass 2010); see also Commonwealth v. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 698 
F.Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 120. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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states where the people can directly vote on the issue, as by 
constitutional amendment or direct-democracy legislative processes, 
such a process would be more appropriate because the issue concerns 
the proposed reconstitution of a basic social institution of and for the 
people. Using processes of local decision, not national determination, 
reflective of popular will and with popular-involvement, allowing for 
incremental change, not all-at-once quick-solution universal revolution, 
are important to any effort to redefine marriage that respects citizen 
belonging in the state and national political communities. 
One of the most ironic consequences of the battle over same-sex 
marriage in California, Iowa, and Massachusetts has been the judicial 
disenfranchisement of the citizens in those states who opposed the 
redefinition of marriage to include same-sex couples.121 It was 
particularly disturbing when a California federal court overturned the 
results of an extensively debated constitutional amendment ballot-
initiative (Proposition 8).122 Exclusion of citizens from the political 
community and the silencing their voices because of their views on 
where the boundaries of the social institution of marriage are drawn is 
one of the tragic, malicious ironies of our time.  Similarly, the 
unilateral decision of President Obama to refuse to defend the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act,123 after it had been successfully defended 
and upheld (and never held invalid) in multiple cases before his 
administration took office,124 reflects a troubling presidential 
authoritarianism that demeans the marriage values established and 
supported by democratic processes, undermines both democratic 
processes and popular sovereignty, marginalizes and disenfranchises 
the people. 
 
 121. Varnem v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); In re Coordination Proceeding, 
Special Title [Rule 1550(c)] Marriage Cases, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. S. F. 
County, Mar. 14, 2005), aff’d In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by 
Cal. Proposition 8, Nov. 4, 2008, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009); 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 943, 959 (Mass. 2003); In re Opinion of 
the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569–71 (Mass. 2004). 
 122. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 123. Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage 
Act, Feb. 23, 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html 
(last visited  Feb. 23, 2011). 
 124. Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 686 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district 
court’s dismissal of a Section Two claim, and remanding to dismiss a Section Three claim on the 
merits); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303–09 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding DOMA does 
not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, equal protection, or due process); In re Kandu, 315 
B.R. 123, 131–48 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (finding DOMA does not violate comity, the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful seizure, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantees of 
due process and equal protection, or the Tenth Amendment’s reservation to the states of the 
power to regulate marriage), The first time a suit challenging DOMA succeeded was after the 
Obama administration took over the defense of DOMA and presented a tepid, cave-in defense. 
Commonwealth v. Dep’t. Health & Human Servs., 698 F.Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010); Gill v. 
Office of Personnel Management, 699 F.Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION: BELONGING 
 
The definition of marriage and family are the defining issues of 
our generation. How the issues are decided will have life-changing, 
world-changing consequences, for better or worse.125 The 
disintegration of marriage and other family relations has tsunami-sized 
“ripple effects” on all other communities in and comprising society. 
As goes marriage so goes the family, and as goes the family so goes 
the nation, and the world. The boundaries of belonging matter 
immensely for our own families, our children and grandchildren, and 
for our nation. 
Just as Frost’s “Mending Wall” ambiguously leaves us to decide 
whether his emphasis is on the wall (arguably a negative) or the 
communal-neighborly effort of mending (clearly a positive), the issue 
of legalization of same-sex marriage is for us to decide. In matters of 
relationships, including political relationships, the process sometimes 
(often) is as critical, if not more critical, than the particular results of 
the process. The process of addressing policy differences by 
participatory electoral politics in a democratic society is intended to 
strengthen society not just by the substance of the new laws adopted, 
but by helping us to appreciate and understand each other better, to 
strengthen our ties to each other by the common effort of seeking to 
resolve the controversy, and by building trust and other aspects of 
social capital as a result of the interaction. Of course, dishonorable 
political tricks can diminish respect for the political process and 
produce an alienating, disintegrative effect. Likewise, circumvention 
of democratic processes (popular ballot or legislative) by litigation 
campaigns seeking “quick-fix, winner-take-all” victories in the courts 
undermines legitimate process and subverts the unifying, edifying 
purposes and benefits of the democratic system. Thus, federalism in 
family law, leaving the issue to the states to decide by democratic 
popular ballot procedures of by legislative determination is critical. 
This issue is far too important to leave to judges to decide. The issue 
is and should remain in the hands of the people. Unless the courts 
inappropriately usurp the issue, the future of marriage should be, and 
is, up to us to decide. 
 
 125. WILLIAM GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATERNS 318 (1993) (“[T]he family 
is so intertwined with other social structures that it is not possible to transform it without 
reversing a multitude of other trends in modern social life. . . . I know of no great civilization 
that at the height of its power and material splendor ever changed its grand onward movement, 
except by dissolution and military defeat.”); CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN, FAMILY AND CIVILIZATION 
(1947) (breakdown of family often precedes breakdown of civilization). 
  
 
